Introduction by Olof, Pettersson
1© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017 
O. Pettersson, V. Songe-Møller (eds.), Plato’s Protagoras, Philosophical Studies 
Series 125, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-45585-3_1
 Introduction 
 Olof  Pettersson 
 Guided by the bold ambition to reexamine the nature of philosophy, questions about 
the foundations and origins of Plato’s dialogues have in recent years gained a new 
and important momentum. In the wake of the seminal work of Andrea Nightingale 
and especially her book  Genres in Dialogue from 1995, Plato’s texts have come to 
be reconsidered in terms of their compositional and intergeneric fabric. 
Supplementing important research on the argumentative structures of the dialogues, 
it has been argued that Plato’s philosophizing cannot be properly assessed without 
considering its intellectual debts. By detailed examinations of the practical, generic 
and textual origins of the dialogues, it has been shown how Plato’s chosen form of 
philosophical inquiry is deeply infl uenced by traditional forms of poetry, rhetoric, 
sophistry, and even medicine (e.g. McCoy  2008 ; Fagan  2013 ; Tell  2011 ; Levin 
 2014 ). 
 On this view, the reasons why Plato decided to write in this way are complex and 
diverse, but one shared and uncontested premise is that the dialogue form allowed 
him to discuss and scrutinize the intellectual tendencies of his day and age in a way 
that other literary forms could not (Destrée and Herrmann  2011 ; Peterson  2011 ). 
The dialogue made it possible for Plato to internalize rival types of authoritative 
discourse into his philosophical project without committing it to their claims and 
principles (Frede  1992 ; Nightingale  1995 . Cf. Long  2013 ). 
 In stressing this point, contemporary research is however faced with a problem 
that has played a less prominent role in traditional scholarship: Even if it may seem 
reasonable to suppose that Plato’s attempt to introduce and vindicate a new type of 
intellectual practice – called philosophy – required proleptic strategies and deep 
knowledge of the traditions whose authority he wanted to challenge, these strategies 
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2have proven to be notoriously diffi cult to separate from the target of his supposed 
critique. Insofar as we acknowledge that Plato’s dialogues are full of  non- philosophical 
voices, we must also ask where, exactly, the lines are to be drawn. Where does the 
substantial contribution of philosophy begin and where is Plato merely entertaining 
an argument for the sake of its refutation? Although Plato’s attitude towards rheto-
ric, for example, is as explicit as it is harsh, his own dialogues are not only rhetorical 
masterpieces in all senses of the word. It is also clear that even philosophically 
direct dialogues, such as the  Apology , are written in a way that makes it impossible 
to think that they are composed without a profound infl uence by Athens’ politico-
forensic practice and its established rhetorical traditions. 
 One question, in relation to which this issue has proven to be signifi cantly diffi -
cult to untangle, concerns the difference between philosophy and sophistry. At a 
fi rst glance the philosopher and the sophist may seem to be each other’s opposites. 
While the philosopher is poor, devoted to virtue, cares only for the soul and talks 
with the voice of blunt honesty, the sophist sells his teachings for a profi t, cares 
more for his reputation than for his soul and deceives his fellow men with his clever 
tongue. At a closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the differences are not 
that easy to determine. Even if Plato’s attitude is generally hostile, some sophists 
turn out to care a lot for virtue; and Socrates, the philosopher, is quite a clever 
speaker himself. Like the wolf and the dog, it seems, they are not always that easy 
to tell apart. 
 To fully understand the tension in Plato’s account of sophistry, there are, of 
course, many factors to consider. Besides Plato’s own explicit arguments, and his 
rich and complex portraits of historical fi gures such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias 
or Thrasymachus, there is however one additional factor that may turn out to be 
important. Plato’s derogatory attitude may hide a deep intellectual debt. However 
indigestible it may seem, there are good reasons to doubt that the method of short 
questions and answers, that we have come to know as the mark of Socratic question-
ing, was a Platonic novelty. Instead, crucial parts of what Plato eternalized in the 
dialogue form may just as well have been a living and well-established sophistic 
practice (Frede  1992 , xv). If this is true, what we generally consider to be Socratic 
questioning and a distinct and important characteristic of Plato’s philosophical 
methodology is better described as an eloquent adaptation of an already infl uential 
and broadly acknowledged form of intellectual activity. And it is thus not ultimately 
clear if this method can be called philosophy at all. To distinguish the authentic 
voice of philosophy, it seems, we must look deeper. 
 Here, Plato’s dialogue the  Protagoras stands out as particularly important. In the 
guise of an intellectual competition between Protagoras and Socrates, this dialogue 
is often seen as the great showdown between philosophy and sophistry. While 
Protagoras teaches virtue for a fee and promises to make his students better every 
day, Socrates begins by denying that virtue can be taught, and questions the edifi ca-
tory effects of the sophist’s teachings. Supposedly meant to mark the difference 
between the philosopher and his rival, the dialogue sets out as a warning. Even if he 
admittedly does not know what it involves, Socrates explains that sophistry may be 
deceptive. In carefully weighed words, addressed to the young and somewhat 
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3 confused Hippocrates, Socrates says that without knowledge of what is good for the 
health of the soul, getting involved with sophists may not be worth the price. 
 Despite the fact that this opening may seem to suggest that Socrates and his 
young friend should remain in the security of their own conversation, this, of course, 
is not what happens. Whatever risks it may involve, they go and talk to the sophist. 
And as soon as Protagoras is allowed to explain himself, the distinctions are blurred. 
As it turns out, the sophist is a much more complex and morally interesting charac-
ter than the dialogue’s introductory conversation may seem to suggest. Not only 
does he want to foster virtue. He also encourages moral integrity and defends the 
importance of self-evaluation. Instead of exploiting this character to emphasize 
Socrates’ unique devotion to virtue and philosophy’s role in the task of becoming a 
better person, Plato presents a nuanced picture. Protagoras, in Gregory Vlastos’ 
famous words from 1956, “has moral inhibitions”, and while the sophist explains 
that his words are not just said for the sake of the argument, but “having regarded 
also the whole of [his] life” (Vlastos  1956 ), the moral depth of his teachings shines 
through: Protagoras, for example, both “refuses to admit that injustice is compatible 
with sôphrosunê [and to] identify a life of pleasure with the good life” (Vlastos 
 1956 ). 
 Although there may be many different reasons why Plato decided to characterize 
Protagoras in this way, it is reasonably clear that he is not out to make things simple. 
Even if Protagoras may charge a fee, his sophistical teachings are not to be identi-
fi ed with the amoral, hedonistic and relativistic school of thought it is popularly 
recognized as. Instead, and in contrast to Socrates’ warnings, the sophist is pre-
sented as a fairly competent and reasonable person, and to make things even more 
complicated, Socrates himself turns out to be a rather sketchy fi gure. In contrast to 
what one might expect of a dialogue designed to defend philosophy’s greatest hero 
in the heat of combat, Socrates is not depicted as a champion of truth and clarity. 
Evidenced, for example, by his repeated appeal to his forgetfulness, and his many 
cunning attempts to infl uence the form of the conversation, one has only to take a 
brief look at the dialogue’s narrative framework to see what is at stake. Since it is 
Socrates who relates the detailed discussion with Hippocrates and the sophists to his 
unnamed friend from memory, it is not only clear that he lies throughout the conver-
sation. His manipulative strategies are also refl ected by the way he constantly 
undermines the authority of his own words. He surrounds his defense of short ques-
tions and answers with a set of speeches much longer than Protagoras’. He exempli-
fi es his preferred method by a long interpretative oration. And as if this was not 
enough, at the end, he also manages to win the intellectual competition he denies 
knowing how to play. 
 Where, in this, is the philosopher? Where are we to draw the line? 
 This book is an attempt to help answer these questions. As a part of the new 
scholarly interest in Plato’s endeavor to defi ne and defend philosophy in a complex 
and rich intellectual context, and by paying close attention to the dialogue’s  structure 
and composition, this book is compiled to address the question of how philosophy 
is dramatized and discussed in the  Protagoras . From a variety of different perspec-
tives, all chapters contribute to the task of understanding how Plato fought to estab-
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this involved. 
 While many of the authors in this volume argue for a sharp distinction between 
sophistry and philosophy, this is contested by others. Hallvard Fossheim’s “The 
Question of Methodology in Plato’s  Protagoras ” belongs to the fi rst camp and 
offers a synoptic discussion of the  Protagoras as a whole. While this dialogue has 
defi ed a cohesive reading, it is Fossheim’s aim to suggest a point of view that allows 
us to see what may unify it. By combining a reading of two compositional levels – 
the structural-argumentative and the dramatic – he argues that the  Protagoras is 
mainly a discussion and an illustration of method. This, he suggests, becomes clear 
as the dialogue lays bare a contrast between two means of soul-shaping: while 
Protagoras’ long speeches allow a semi-digested vision to lure itself into their lis-
teners, the transparency of Socrates’ questions and answers come with a build-in- 
defense against such impact. While Protagoras’ speeches give their listeners the 
enjoyable experience of having understood, although the basic components of the 
story have not been unwrapped, Socrates’ approach ensures that thinking, or learn-
ing, is done in small, well-defi ned steps that allows the listener to refl ect and to 
comprehend each inferential move. According to Fossheim, the central issue of the 
 Protagoras is thus not which theory to believe, but how to reach that belief or 
knowledge: which method to abide by. 
 With a similar intension of inquiring into the general orientation of the dialogue, 
Knut Ågotnes’ “Socrates’ Sophisticated Attack on Protagoras” sets out to analyze 
the nature of Protagoras’ teachings. This he sees as the dialogues’ main theme. In 
contrast to what is often thought, Ågotnes argues that Socrates is here not practicing 
his usual method of questions and answers in order to investigate the nature of vir-
tue, as in many other dialogues. Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras is rather 
designed to trap the sophist into self-exposure. In order to elucidate and display the 
obscurity of Protagoras’ teaching – which he holds to be what Socrates sets out to 
uncover – Ågotnes suggest a distinction between virtue and value. Through a 
detailed analysis of the discussions about the distinct virtues, he shows that 
Protagoras makes the virtues into slaves of values, such as pleasure or honor, and 
thus ultimately deprives them of a true moral content. 
 Hayden W. Ausland’s “The Treatment of Virtue in Plato’s  Protagoras ” deepens 
the discussion of the virtues and their unity by a broad analysis of the perspectives 
presented by the dialogues’ different interlocutors. In the  Protagoras , Ausland 
argues, Plato subjects virtue to examination, starting from two main questions: (1) 
Can virtue be taught? and (2) Is it one thing or many? One at a time, Ausland ana-
lyzes the way virtue is discussed from the distinct perspectives of the dialogue’s 
characters. He follows these perspectives out along several philosophical-literary 
pathways, both ancient and modern, and shows that even if the meaning assigned to 
virtue in this dialogue remains elusive, it must nevertheless be more complex than 
what is usually allowed in modernizing philosophical interpretations of it: If virtue 
cannot be taught, we nevertheless fi nd ourselves learning about it; and if it is not 
clearly a unity about which we read, we fi nd ourselves prompted to look for an 
understanding of it that, in due course, can emerge as such. 
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the Art of the Physician of Souls in Plato’s  Protagoras ” also analyses the difference 
between Socrates and Protagoras. Larsen takes his point of departure in the dia-
logue’s beginning. Here Socrates offers a warning to the young and ambitious 
Hippocrates: To entrust one’s soul to a sophist, he says, is dangerous, if one – like 
Hippocrates – does not know what is good and bad for the soul. In the light of this 
warning, one dramatic feature of the dialogue may seem strange: Why, if it is dan-
gerous, does Socrates accompany Hippocrates to meet Protagoras? In order to 
explain this decision, Larsen argues that Socrates does two things. He demonstrate 
what it means to be a physician of the soul and he shows that what Hippocrates 
desires is not what Protagoras offers for sale. While Hippocrates hopes to become 
good at speaking, and thus achieve honor as a politician, the eubolia, or good coun-
cil, that Protagoras claims to teach is something else. Rather than being an art of 
speaking, it is the ability of self-benefi cial calculation. This Socrates also manages 
to show Hippocrates by beating the sophist in the give and take of conversation: If 
Hippocrates wants to become good at speaking, he should not go with Protagoras, 
but stay with Socrates. 
 In a similar vein, Vivil Valvik Haraldsen’s “Is Pleasure Any Good? Weakness of 
Will and the Art of Measurement in Plato’s  Protagoras ” aims at exposing the soph-
ist’s moral assumptions by an analysis of Socrates’ proposed hedonism. Valvik 
Haraldsen looks for the function of his hedonistic positon in the dialogue as a whole 
and suggests that Socrates’ argument against the weakness of will, as well as his 
proposal of the art of measurement as the salvation of our life, not only has the 
hedonistic thesis as a premise. These arguments also function as a reductio ad absur-
dum of the thesis itself. In this way, Valvik Haraldsen argues that Socrates’ conver-
sation with Protagoras aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable 
and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it 
involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is. 
 Cynthia Freeland’s “The Science of Measuring Pleasure and Pain” expands the 
discussion of the art of measurement in arguing that while Socrates seems to pro-
pose such an art, it has a limited and qualifi ed scope. In so doing, she addresses the 
famous argument in which Socrates denies the possibility of weakness of will (akra-
sia). The argument appears to presuppose hedonism, and scholars have debated 
whether it should be taken at face value. Socrates says that to save people from its 
unfortunate consequences, we need an art or a science of measurement. Freeland 
shows that even if the dialogue’s imagery and language indicate that Socrates does 
propose an art that may measure or evaluate goods, including pleasures, this need 
not involve anything like a simplistic utilitarian hedonic calculus. The primary pur-
pose of the science of measurement has instead a limited scope: just as we need 
reason to combat sensory illusions, the science of measurement can combat false 
appearances of pleasure. And although the  Protagoras itself does not expand on the 
details of this science, Freeland suggests that they are possible to reconstruct, with 
the aid of related passages from the  Republic and  Philebus . 
 Further specifying how the  Protagoras negotiates the borders and scope of phi-
losophy, Gro Rørstadbotten’s “Turning Towards Philosophy: A Reading of the 
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losophy. In the  Protagoras , she suggests, the readers are allowed to witness both 
how Socrates turns into philosophy and how Hippocrates turns towards it. 
Rørstadbotten’s argument takes its point of departure in a detailed analyses of a set 
of distinct dramatic scenes: the opening meeting between Socrates and an anony-
mous friend; the bedroom scene, where Hippocrates, in the early morning, gets 
Socrates out of bed; and the courtyard scene, where Socrates awaken Hippocrates 
towards a recognition of his own ignorance. Not only the dramatic settings, but also 
the dramatic date of the dialogue is essential for Rørstadbotten’s interpretation: the 
dialogue takes place when Socrates is 28 years old and is thus reasonably taken to 
be philosophy’s fi rst appearance in the distinctive form of Socratic questioning. As 
the  Protagoras displays an important departure from sophistry and the teachings of 
Protagoras, Rørstadbotten argues that the dialogue marks a crucial moment in the 
development of philosophy. 
 With a similar ambition, Marina McCoy’s “Plato’s  Protagoras , Writing, and the 
Comedy of Aporia” aims at showing where philosophy begins and ends. In a com-
parative analysis with Aristophanes’  Clouds , McCoy shows that Plato’s  Protagoras 
plays off the genre of Old Comedy. In laying bare their many structural connections, 
she argues that Plato applies a variety of discursive strategies, commonly found in 
comedy, to undermine Protagoras’ reputation of being wise. In this way McCoy 
shows how Protagoras and his sophist friends are brought down from epic heights 
to comic lows. But, as McCoy also points out, as Socrates joins in the sophists’ 
conversation, he is also himself brought down. However, just as Old Comedy is both 
funny and serious in its treatment of urgent issues in contemporary society, the 
 Protagoras is also both funny and serious in its treatment of urgent ethical and intel-
lectual issues. It is in this light, McCoy suggests, that the dialogue’s many unsolved 
problems must be seen. As it discusses the unity of virtue, whether virtue can be 
taught or not or if hedonism has something to offer, the dialogue lingers where the 
problems are most crucial; and by revealing the tensions and positions at stake, the 
need for philosophical investigation is established and brought to the surface. 
 In a similar vein, Vigdis Songe-Møller’s “Socrates’ Irony: A Voice from 
Nowhere?” sets out to locate the position from where philosophy speaks. By inves-
tigating the relations between the notion of voice ( phonê ), the frequent occupation 
with place, and the notion of  atopos (“no place” or “strange”), she offers an eluci-
dating topology of the dialogue and its proposed positions. Songe-Møller takes her 
point of departure in the fi rst words of the dialogue: “From where, Socrates, have 
you just arrived?” or “From where, Socrates, are you appearing?” According to 
Songe-Møller these words point directly to the dialogue’s leading question: From 
where does Socrates, the philosopher, arrive? From which perspective does he – and 
his dialogue partner, Protagoras – speak? According to Songe-Møller, the  Protagoras 
both asks and answers these questions. In the form of an elegant portrait of how the 
famous sophist speaks with a foreign, or external, voice, Plato shows that he speaks 
from an illusionary topos. And this allows Socrates positon to stand out: Socrates 
does not only speak with his own authentic voice. From the perspective of one that 
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essary for philosophical inquiry. 
 Through a discussion of three short remarks on the medium of philosophy, Olof 
Pettersson’s “Dangerous Voices: On Written and Spoken Discourse in Plato’s 
 Protagoras ” problematizes the simple distinction between philosophical and 
sophistical inquiry. In line with Socrates’ warning of the dangers of sophistic teach-
ing, Pettersson argues that the three discursive forms practiced and discussed in the 
dialogue – long speeches, discussion of poetry and short questions and answers – all 
share a common problem: They sanction a commoditized use of language. And as 
such they are all equally dangerous for the one who seeks intellectually authenticity. 
In showing how also short questions and answers are liable to this critique, Pettersson 
does not only question the common assumption that the  Protagoras is designed to 
display a functional philosophical method. He also shows how the  Protagoras pro-
motes independent and autonomous thinking at the expense of premediated 
teachings. 
 Kristin Sampson’s “Visible and Audible Movement in the  Protagoras ” also pur-
sues by problematizing the difference between the rhetoric of sophistry and the 
dialectic of philosophy. By looking at a set of different forms of transitions from the 
visible to the audible, Sampson asks how the dialogue’s dramatic settings are meant 
to illustrate and problematize the conditions of dialectical inquiry. With her point of 
departure in a close reading of 309a–310b and 314c–318e, Sampson suggests that 
important clues are to be found in a shift of focus: While the dialogue begins with a 
focus on Socrates’ physical desire for the beauty of Alcibiades, this visual desire is 
soon replaced by an audible: the beauty of the words of Protagoras. According to 
Sampson, similar transitions are traceable throughout the text, and they mark a 
move away from the corporeal, toward the expression of a concern for the internal 
and the character or the soul. By making the beauty of sophistic rhetoric and the 
philosophers’ care for the soul parts of the same movement, Sampson both identi-
fi es whence dialectical exchange emerge and complicates any simple distinction 
between philosophy and sophistry. 
 With a related purpose, Paul Woodruff’s “Why Did Protagoras Use Poetry in 
Education?” also problematizes the difference between Socrates and Protagoras, 
and suggests that their affi nities are greater than often assumed. Woodruff begins in 
the lengthy discussion on Simonides’ poem. Here, important likenesses and differ-
ences between the philosopher and the sophist are on display. While Socrates, by 
parodying what he takes to be Protagoras’ method, shows the absurdity of trying to 
fi nd out what a dead poet intended by his ambiguous, and even contradictory, lines, 
Protagoras criticizes Simonides with the aim of straightening out what the poet says 
and to end up with a true expression of the poet’s intention. According to Woodruff 
there is however also a profound affi nity between the two: Even if Protagoras exam-
ines texts by dead poets and Socrates examines beliefs of those alive, they both 
agree that speakers have the power to improve their beliefs by seeing and fi xing 
tensions among them. “If I am right”, Woodruff concludes, “Protagoras is the grand-
father of what Plato has given us as Socratic questioning, the  elenchus ”. 
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